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Abstract: Our culture is dominated by digital documents in ways that are easy to overlook.
These documents have changed our worldviews about science and have raised our expectations
of them as tools for knowledge justification. This paper explores the complexities surrounding
the digital document by revisiting Michael Polanyi’s theory of tacit knowledge—the idea that
“we can know more than we can tell.” The theory presents to us a dilemma: if we can know more
than we can tell, then this means that the communication of science via the document as a
primary form of telling will always be incomplete. This dilemma presents significant challenges
to the open science movement.
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The wonderful thing about metaphors is that they often hide in plain sight, and this is true
whether they are everyday kinds of metaphors or the kinds of metaphors that we use in scientific
writing or analysis. For example, the digital document presented to us in an office word
processor application as a sheet of paper is a graphical metaphor of a physical sheet of paper
(otherwise referred to as a skeuomorphism); that is, it is a conceptual mapping (i.e., the
metaphor) expressed graphically as well as linguistically (i.e., its “metaphorical expression”).1 I
was reminded of both the power and the frailty of this metaphor recently when I observed a
young child use word processor software for the first time. The child, wanting to use a computer
to write a story about a dragon and a giant, knew how to write, relative to their age, but the near
entirety of their textual experience had been with physical paper. They were familiar with others
reading to them from paper books, reading from paper books themselves, and drawing and
learning to write on physical paper. Thus, on their first introduction to word processor software,
they apparently seemed comfortable with the image of a physical sheet of paper that was
presented to them.
However, as the child pressed keys to write something, the metaphor of the sheet of paper
began to crumple. I had not anticipated this when I introduced them to the software. For me (as a
long-time user of these types of programs), these issues with the software and the system
surrounding it had become seamless by use, if not by design.2 The child’s questions reminded me
of how accustomed I had become to the interface that I had forgotten the kinds of issues their
questions raised. Here are a few of the issues that arose—all because of the loss of integrity of
the paper metaphor:
1. Upon initial use, the child assumed that they could write anywhere on the page, as
they often do when using physical sheets of paper and did not understand at first why
they were restricted to the top left of the page.
2. The child had to learn how to manipulate the cursor to create empty, editable
space on the page, even though what they were presented with appeared to be empty,
editable space: i.e., a blank sheet of paper.
3. The child noticed the page indicator on the bottom of the application window
after having created four pages of text of various colors, sizes, and font types, and they
had navigated to page three when they noticed it, which informed them that they were on
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page 3 of 4. The child concluded that it was unfortunate that they only had four pages to
use. They had inferred that page 3 of 4 meant that four was the maximum number of
sheets available to them.
4. Spell checking was turned on, and the child noted the red squiggly lines that
appeared under misspelled words. When I told the child what those lines meant, the child
altered their behavior. Instead of simply writing and playing with the text, the child began
to switch modes—write, edit, write, edit. This became a distraction and a source of worry,
which the child did not have before.
I do not know if the above experience will end up as an important memory for the child,
but it was important to me, not just as someone who knows and cares deeply about this person
but also as a someone interested in the kinds of things, such as metaphors, that hide in plain sight
yet may influence our behaviors, relationships, beliefs, and knowledge. This is true not only for
those common, everyday kinds of metaphors but also the ones we use in our more rigorous areas
of experience, such as in the sciences.
In the child’s case, the graphical metaphor expressed as a sheet of paper served as a
source of confusion and obstruction, but in the sciences, metaphors are often intentionally, if not
always successfully, conceived and employed to enlighten rather than to obstruct or confuse.3
The philosopher of science Susan Haack wrote that “while some scientific metaphors are more
decorative than functional, others suggest questions to investigate, directions in which to look,”
regardless whether those directions may lead us astray or to fruitful lines of inquiry.4 If Haack is
correct, then it seems appropriate to ask about the origins of those metaphors that are used in the
sciences—of things like “black hole,” “superbugs,” “food chains,” and “invisible hand,” or
problematic ones, like “sleeping beauty,” all of which are intended to provide a special sort of
“epistemic access.” 5
It is certainly the case that metaphors in science may arise out of popular culture and
from literature of any genre, which is also where good philosophical and theoretical thinking can
be found. Nathaniel Hawthorne’s short story, “Earth’s Holocaust,” could be said to offer a theory
that locates the source of moral problems not in institutions, literature, art, and epistemologies
but in human nature itself, and his story therefore criticizes our attempts to fix the world (by
burning everything) without addressing that nature first.6 If theory is a collection of
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interdependent propositions that explain something about the world (biological or social or the
like), where propositions are statements that express something meant to be true, then surely
literature can include such statements, even if the goal of literature is neither to explain nor
predict nor classify but, as is sometimes the function of art, to foster understanding, inspire
wonder or critique, express rage or love, or highlight injustice. We might derive from
Hawthorne’s story some important theoretical insight about the emptiness of our revolutionary
motivations, as a result, without first looking inward at other probable causes. Metaphor, then,
can be used not only to point the way, as Haack noted, but also to forge scientific theories and to
learn how to ask good questions. As the philosopher Richard Boyd argued:
There exists an important class of metaphors which play a role in the development and
articulation of theories in relatively mature sciences. Their function is a sort of
catachresis—that is, they are used to introduce theoretical terminology where none
previously existed…. Indeed, their users are typically unable to precisely specify the
relevant respects of similarity or analogy, and the utility of these metaphors in theory
change crucially depends upon this open-endedness.7
It seems helpful to ask if a substitution is true, too. If scientists use metaphors such as
“worm holes,” “black holes,” “electron clouds,” and “the cloud” to constitute, build, and
communicate theories, then surely artists use metaphors to make propositions that likewise
function as a theory of some part of reality. This should be true even if the propositions are
embedded within dialogue, analogies, allusions, tropes, or allegories. For instance, in one part of
Don DeLillo’s 1985 novel, White Noise, we find the protagonist waiting at the airport with his
ex-wife for the arrival of their daughter. As they wait and passengers disembark a newly arrived
plane, an exiting passenger stops to recount a harrowing story about a sudden, steep drop in the
plane’s altitude. When the protagonist’s daughter finally appears, she says, in reference to the
tale:
“Where’s the media?” she said.
“There is no media in Iron City.”
“They went through all that for nothing?”8
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This simple exchange between two characters in a novel expresses a kind of general,
propositional truth about our media-enriched social world (or social-enriched media world) and
captures a postmodern concept that has gained theoretical traction in the intervening decades as
the ability to document and disseminate has scaled—another metaphorical term—along with the
growth of the web; as Leonard Wilcox observes, a work like “White Noise suggests such
moments of authentic and unfettered subjectivity are being supplanted by a Baudrillardian
euphoria or ‘schizophrenia’ which characterises the experience of the self in the space of the
simulacrum.”9 In today’s parlance, this is reflected in the “pics or it didn’t happen” meme: a
requirement that the transmission through a media, the simulacrum, provides the necessary
condition for the self’s existence as if our substantiality necessarily depends upon that media.10
So here we are—we have gone from a simple facsimile of a sheet of paper that functions
as an inadequate graphical metaphor to the necessary existence of the document, likely presented
via some metaphorical abstraction and disseminated as media to justify a proposition. More
succinctly, these may be stated as theses:
Thesis 1: The digital document is a (inadequate) metaphor.
Thesis 2: This (inadequate) metaphor necessarily provides the justification to know a
proposition (that something is true) about reality.
This is not to say that the “pics or didn’t happen” concept is a good theory about the
possibility of postmodern truth about self-hood. Video footage, i.e., documentation, can be
contested and re-interpreted. When footage or documentation is contested, opposing sides form
to contest the facts of the case that have been captured on video or in phone call transcripts.11 In
such cases, the accused work diligently to find a way out or an alternate interpretation (or
“narrative,” to use a post-academic, trending term), in order to negate what has been recorded—
to argue that the real was not fully documented and therefore what was documented was not fully
real. That aside, the point is that art and literature and music and other non-scientific genres can
provide important theoretical insights. And it can be good to appreciate art when it is capable of
doing this kind of work. Rebecca Solnit’s 2013 The Faraway Nearby is one such example but in
the form of a kind of memoir and reflection on topics including age, illness, frailty, family, and
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more.12 The Faraway Nearby begins with a delivery of apricots from Solnit’s mother’s tree that,
over time, begin to ripen and decay as they lay on her bedroom floor. Some of the apricots are
eventually used to make jam but some rot because of Solnit’s indecision. These motifs of worth,
change, and decay appear throughout the memoir.
Of course, there may be as many takeaways from this memoir as there are readers. This is
part of the beauty of art, that it can mean something different depending on who we are or where
we are in our lives but still provide insight into the fundamental aspects of reality that we all
share. Arnold Hauser, a sociologist and art historian, provides a description of this shared
purpose of art and science:
A work of art is not “correct” or “incorrect” in the way a scientific theory is; it cannot
properly speaking be termed either true or false. The concept of changeless,
superhistorical validity can be applied to art only with very special reservations, and here
all talk of “false consciousness,” as of correct consciousness, is out of place. In other
words: when truth is not what is aimed at, it is idle to speak of conformity to it or evasion
of it. Art is partisan through and through, and because a view of reality which did not
reflect any particular standpoint would be devoid of all artistic quality, the problem of
relativity simply does not arise in art. Every aspect of art is a perspective; only one that
involves an inner contradiction can rightly be termed “false.”
And yet it would be wrong to deny to art all claim of achieving truth, to deny that
it can make a valuable contribution to our knowledge of the world and of man. That
works of literature are an abundant source of knowledge requires perhaps no further
proof; the most penetrating achievements of psychological insight which we have at our
disposal derive from the masters of novel and drama. But there can be no doubt that the
visual arts also contribute a good deal toward giving us our bearings in the world. It is, of
course, important to point out the difference between scientific knowledge and artistic
representation, to emphasize, for instance, that to speak “stylistic” trends is perfectly
legitimate in art, but very questionable in science. The sociologist, however, can only feel
uneasy about any too radical separation of art and science. For after all, the worldview of
a generation—or, more exactly, of a group that is historically and socially selfcontained—is an indivisible whole. Attempts to demarcate the different fields in which

6
this world-view manifests itself may be very promising from the epistemological point of
view, but to the sociologist they appear as violent dissections of the reality he studies. To
him, philosophy, science, law, custom, and art are different aspects of one unitary attitude
to reality: in all these forms men are searching for an answer to the same question, for a
solution to one and the same problem of how to live. They are not ultimately concerned
with formulating scientific truths, producing works of art, or even laying down moral
precepts, but with achieving a workable world-view, a reliable guiding principle for life.
Always and everywhere they are bent upon one and the same task, that of subjugating the
bewildering strangeness and ambiguity of things.13
So, art is not like science, but is. In the latter, the goal is to come to a consensus on
meaning and facts, but there are parts of the artistic endeavor, subjective as they may be, that do
theoretical work, and as a researcher of things related to documentation and information and
libraries, I find that it is partly my task to note those things, just as I had noted and was taken
aback by the personal rediscovery of a word processor document as a metaphorical sheet of
physical paper.
One particular passage from Solnit’s work struck me in this way, in that, beyond the
specifics, it suggested something meaningful and theoretical about the relationship between
geography, environment, and recorded knowledge, of which belief is a prerequisite of the latter.
Solnit wrote:
Years ago I visited a friend who lived on a houseboat and while admiring the lemon trees
and prickly pears flourishing ferociously in half-barrel planters on his deck was told that
the deck was forever rotting away from the dampness and had to be replaced at least once
a decade. As we walked down the long plank boardwalk back to shore, we talked about
whether humidity and aridity themselves could have been forces that shaped religious
belief. There are in many damp places a belief in reincarnation, the eternal renewing of
life and the world, which of course also means eternal dying. In the warm, damp regions
everything disintegrates, regenerates, must be rebuilt, manuscripts must be copied over as
the pages decay, and the air is full of spores and bacterias and insects eager to consume
and transmute.
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In the dry world you can at least fantasize about unchanging permanence and
eternity, and bodies can be mummified, preserved for drying—like fruit, fish, books in
libraries, the Dead Sea scrolls, and paintings in climate-controlled museums. In the cold
world things may also last for ages, like the frozen bodies of mammoths and
mountaineers.14
When I read that, I thought of the following theoretical propositions, not necessarily condoned
here, but just there, implicitly suggested in the text:
1) Documents are sensitive to their environments.
A)

If the environment is polar or arid, documents last longer and have a

chance for permanency.
B)

If the environment is tropical, documents are more susceptible to decay.

2) Our beliefs about the world are shaped by the condition of our documents.
A)

If documents tend toward permanency, then the content of our beliefs have

a permanence to them—a being-ness to them.
B)

If documents are more subject to decay, that is to say, to change, then the

content of our beliefs might have a becoming-ness to them.
I like this idea about the relation between the document and the environment and how the
particulars of that relationship might have an influence on our beliefs and actions over time.15
There was once a time when we were very concerned with this relationship—when the main
focus was on printed works stored on, for example, library shelves. As a reminder, I suggest
reading the 1932 The Library Quarterly article that reports damage caused by bookworms and
fungus and offers tested solutions to these issues by way of controlling humidity and
temperature.16 Despite this, it is true that I may have taken more from Solnit’s passage than she
had intended, but this is art that she has given us, and it is permitted of me to draw meaning from
it in my own way. Artistic warrant offers more latitude than scientific warrant does, perhaps.
However, since I have formulated it as a proto-theory, even if I never set out to test it, I might be
predisposed to such a theory because of my context and because it points to interesting
implications. The main one, in my mind, is a consideration of what happens when we detach the
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document from direct physical interaction and map its content to a concept (conceptual mapping:
the definition of metaphor) that, although still possessing a materiality (its storage), it is not a
materiality of the paper-in-hand kind.17 The end result is that the document’s primary existence is
no longer subject to the kinds of damage that worried previous generations, such as mold,
beetles, or foxing, and it no longer possesses an odor, even if it may succumb to other kinds of
damage when stored on physical items such as optical media or the like.18 (To test the theory, I
might hypothesize that the architecture of recently built academic libraries conforms to these
changes in technology and their use and thus include more windows because they collect and
store fewer physical works [sunlight can damage books] and thus may avoid the concerns with
preserving those physical works? The academic library becomes shaped by the decline in the
need to preserve paper-in-hand items due to a rise in the use of devices that display documents
conceptually.) It is such considerations that might lead us to ask that if the environmental context
of the document has an effect on our beliefs, then what happens to our beliefs when the
document becomes even more conceptually abstracted away from our natural environment?
When its environment changes? When it is mapped to the digital? Therefore:
Thesis 3: The digital document, as a conceptual mapping (metaphor) that has a digital
environment abstracted from a reference point, influences the world-view of the
surrounding culture.
The shortcoming with the theory derived from Solnit is that perhaps our beliefs became
fixed (anchored) when we moved away from primarily oral traditions to written ones, as Walter
Ong proposed—when the document became the gravitational center of our beliefs regardless of
its relative immunity to its surroundings.19 Then it is the case that our beliefs vary around the
document (holding it fixed), which, regardless of the document’s susceptibility to the
environment, is perhaps more stable than any kind of oral tradition can possibly be. But now that
the document in its digital existence itself varies in form and presentation, then it must be the
case that these two things vary: beliefs and documents. As the philosopher David Suda noted,
quoting Walter Ong, “the written alphabet elicits an ‘overwhelming’ sense of control by
immobilizing the unidirectional flow of time.”20 In an offline world, we might have looked to
that “unvarying text” for a sense of stability, as the author Larry McMurtry does when motivated
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to re-read.21 But today, writing and the written alphabet themselves are both mobile, and in their
hastened flux, make understanding our beliefs all that much more complicated.
So the document and its form and presentation influence our beliefs (and certainly the
other way around—but the goal here is to reflect on the one direction for now). The crux of this
is that belief is a necessary but insufficient component of knowledge. When philosophers write
about epistemology, they write about how we know things and how we provide justification so
that we may know, and quite a bit of this epistemological work is spent on a certain kind of
knowledge. This knowledge is the kind of knowledge that we articulate (make explicit) when we
say a thing propositionally, like, “I know that the planet Earth is largely spherical in shape.”
Propositional knowledge is also sometimes referred to as know-that knowledge and is often
structured in a particularly grammatical way to aid demonstration and analysis: e.g., S knows
that P, or a Subject knows that a Proposition.22
Knowledge, under the justified true belief (JTB) view, states that we can only know P if it
is true (T) and not false, we can only know P if we believe (B) P and not if we do not believe P,
and we can only know P if we have justification (J) in believing P and not otherwise, such as by
luck.23 If these conditions are sufficiently met, then we have knowledge of the know-that type.
For example, if we fail to meet the condition of belief that the planet Earth is largely spherical in
shape (i.e., we do not believe that the planet Earth is largely spherical in shape), then we do not
carry that knowledge around with us (e.g., flat earthers may know that people believe that the
Earth is largely spherical in shape, but since they themselves do not believe it, they do not know
it). Or, that is knowledge we do not have, even if it is true, even if there is justification for it, and
even if we are aware that such a proposition has been made by others (we might believe they are
lying to us or that their justification is faulty).
The issue is that justification, under the everyday view, largely comes by way of the
document, as recorded testimony, like when we read a report of a science experiment. If the
document has become a digitally-based metaphorical expression of the paper-in-hand kind, if
text is in a state of flux, then this has implications for knowledge of the know-that type.
One way that the condition of the digital document has reshaped beliefs and also attitudes
is reflected in the open science and open access movements, each of which use metaphors with
the term “open,” a term that, while useful and illustrative, hardly captures the theoretical and
applied complexities involved. When the internet and later the web made the storage and
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dissemination of scientific documents possible at a different scale and with fewer physical
distribution restrictions, the new affordances that became available because of the
interdependence of these technologies changed expectations and also beliefs about the way
scientific communication ought to function and also the way science ought to be conducted.24
Therefore:
Thesis 4: We have placed a greater burden on the document to provide justification.
We demand much from the document. Since, most of the time, we cannot watch, interact,
participate, or study in other people’s labs, on their computers, or with them in their fieldwork as
they conduct scientific investigations and experiments, we have depended on the scientist’s
ability to report about the processes, environments, and methods used when investigating and
experimenting. As a result, science, and especially its replicability, depends on good scientific
communication, and good scientific communication now depends on documenting the entire
workflow—i.e., the steps, materials, and other activities and qualities that are a part of that
process (and also on writing well).25 Although this has long been true, the expectations for
documentation, from the document, have only increased. In the past, when science was offline, it
was perhaps sufficient to publish a report of an experiment or a study, but now there is a growing
expectation, and a growing industry, to publish a reproducible work flow, to make the research
(or lab) notes, software code and scripts, data and and other items publicly available and thus
depict in the documentation the know-how process of knowledge production.26 This has likewise
added a burden on the scientist as well as on the infrastructure that supports scientific
communication, like libraries.
Michael Polanyi’s claim that “we can know more than we can tell”—what he refers to as
tacit knowledge—raises additional dilemmas.27 The “tacit” here can sometimes be read and used
per its common usage, as something that is simply not articulated in words or speech, or as
“implicit assumptions” or as things “taken-for-granted.”28 But these conceptualizations
undervalue the epistemological barrier to, per Polanyi, articulate or codify know-how knowledge.
In short, the theory takes a strong epistemological stance when it posits that we can know more
than we can tell, even if there is disagreement about the type of knowledge that may always
remain tacit and the type of knowledge that has the potential to be explicit but has not yet
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become so or that we have not figured out how to make so.29 Some problems we face with tacit
knowledge, with this knowing more than telling problem, is whether tacit knowledge can be
made explicit (can it be codified as know-that knowledge, or information?).30 If so, is it tacit
knowledge rather than just implicit in some way; is it the case that there will always be some
kind of knowledge that will forever resist documentation; and whether, among other things, is it
worth documenting, or attempting to document, certain kinds of tacit or implicit knowledge,
because, for example, the cost is high in some important way or the cognitive load of too much
documentation is burdensome (e.g., information overload)? Case in point: I highly doubt anyone
has learned to ride a bike by reading an instruction manual. However, what if we wanted to train
a robot to ride a bike? Then it would be necessary to codify the process, make explicit some kind
of know-how knowledge by converting it into some kind of know-that knowledge, with respect to
the affordances appropriated to the robot and its programming.
Epistemological transparency is not a new issue for science. Historians and sociologists
of science have written about early motivations to publicize, review, and disseminate scientific
reporting,31 and Robert Merton’s insights about the norms of science touch on the communal
aspect of this issue. However, what is interesting as of late is that web and internet technologies
have rekindled the debate primarily because these technologies, as they have evolved, provide an
enhanced ability to document, in more detail and in more thoroughness, a greater part of the
scientific process—Latour’s “science-in-the-making” aspect and not just the “ready-made
science”—in a spirit of since it can be done, then do it approach, which is not a rational
justification for such an action.32 The assumption is that more and better information and
documentation of the scientific process—the workflow and not merely the reported methods and
findings—the argument goes, will lead to a better way of doing science (across all domains
within it), and a more reliable science. Stated otherwise, it is suggested that the move represents
a migration from the “matter of fact“ mode of science, to the “matter of proof” mode, where
more epistemic weight is placed on the scientific (writ-large) workflow and not just on the
perceived facts that dominate what is communicated in the research report.33
These assumptions, however, need testing. First, the same epistemological questions
raised above apply to scientific workflow documentation as they do to the scientific report—
what do scientists know more than they can tell in the process of doing scientific research? How
much of and of what kind of their tacit knowledge needs to be made explicit, if it can be? If some
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tacit knowledge cannot be made explicit, does this type of knowledge present any true obstacles
to reproducibility that avoids the Gettier problem, where we might achieve reproducibility not by
luck but by true justification?34
Once those epistemological questions are surveyed, then the assumptions about the
communication and practice of science need to be addressed. For example, is the quality of the
scientific enterprise a function of its epistemological transparency—its openness and the
openness of its various aspects? How important are some of these composite parts of science in
its epistemological goal: open science, open access, open source, open standards, open peer
review? What are the upper and lower bounds of this function? Or, if science is a function of
transparency in knowledge production made possible by documentation, what are the lower and
upper bounds of the kind of epistemological transparency needed for a healthy scientific
enterprise? How much tacit must be made explicit? It turns out that these problems hold true
across the spectrum of organized human activity and not just the scientific enterprise if we follow
Susan Haack’s view that scientific knowledge is not epistemologically privileged but simply
more rigorously formed than everyday knowledge.35
It is these challenges that make the tacit knowledge problem interesting for our state of
affairs. In his first lecture in The Tacit Dimension, Polanyi articulates four aspects of tacit
knowing: functional, phenomenal, semantic, and ontological. The functional aspect lays out how
we know a thing tacitly. Specifically, we know a thing tacitly by attending to some related,
explicit thing. His example: people who are given electrical shocks when presented with certain
nonsense syllables know when to expect the shocks even when they cannot say what specific
nonsense syllables are triggering the shocks. They attend to the shocks and, by attending to them,
attend from the particulars that cause them (the nonsense syllables). The particulars become
known in this attending from. How else, Polanyi argues, would subjects in this test know when to
expect the corresponding shocks? But even though the subjects tacitly know the particular
nonsense syllables that trigger the shocks, they can not tell so explicitly since they know more
than they can tell.
The particulars are often difficult to parse. There is a tendency, sometimes, to reduce
wholes to their parts (the particulars) when explaining the wholes. We see this kind of thing
when some scientists or philosophers seek to reduce human consciousness to a kind of physical
location in the brain.36 This kind of thinking has extraordinary implications, for if all higher
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order things (e.g., people) can be reduced to their lower level, basic physical parts (i.e., the
wholes are merely summative of the physical aspects that comprise them), then all problems at
the whole can be addressed simply by attending to the parts, especially the tangible, mechanistic
parts. For example, can all mental health issues be addressed simply by attending to the physical
processes or components in the brain, or, to borrow an example from Polanyi, can we fix
someone’s grammar simply by fixing that person’s vocabulary since the grammar of a language
is simply made up of its parts, the words and their forms? And then, can we attend to someone’s
style of writing simply by attending to that person’s grammar, and so on?
This reductionist way of explaining things by lieu of their physical components (and of
viewing the world, i.e., defining reality or what is real [the ontological]) was a hallmark of
positivism and has been common across all domains of knowledge and areas of practice. Several
years ago I was doing historical work at an institutional archive and reading annual library
reports from around the mid-twentieth century.37 One of the common problems that the head
librarian described in those reports concerned the university administration’s view of the library
as nothing more than a warehouse of books. As the head librarian, Ralph Parker, described it, the
administration at his institution ignored (or even failed to see) the complexities attached to
managing and using a library and, as a result, repeatedly failed to invest in the library and the
librarians who operated it (the practical implication of a reductionist viewpoint). For the
librarian, the library was more than a warehouse of books; in the process of acquiring,
describing, managing, shelving, circulating, and using the works in the library, and the library
itself, something greater emerged or came into existence that was beyond a basic warehouse.
And the thing that emerged was as real as any of its constitutive parts (e.g., books and shelves),
even if it could not be reduced to those parts. Thus, even though the administration would agree
that the library was a real place, it was only real to them as the “cobblestones” of the street are
real—as opposed to whole streets with their social worlds and other components (the whole is
reduced to a part that then becomes its perceived entire ontological substance; perhaps we can
think of this as synecdochic fallacy38). However, per Polanyi, this is a failure to recognize
emergence:
This capacity of a thing to reveal itself in unexpected ways in the future I attribute to the
fact that the thing observed is an aspect of a reality, possessing a significance that is not
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exhausted by our conception of any single aspect of it…. And since I regard the
significance of a thing as more important than its tangibility, I shall say that minds and
problems are more real than cobblestones.39
If we can apply this lesson to the document, we could state that:
Thesis 5: Tacit knowledge warns us against treating the digital document as if it is only a
cobblestone.
Yet this is what the open science movement does, not by introducing a new paradigm but
by expanding the task assigned to the document—to document more, for example, under the
FAIR principle (findable, accessible, interoperable, reusable).40 The “open notebook science
engenders a new epistemic culture that is not based on the construction of ‘matter of facts,’ but in
[what] we have called ‘matter of proof’. It values the meticulous documentation of scientific
practice above the making of scientific facts.”41 Science, long associated with a body of facts, is
now focused on the production of those facts—the creation of new knowledge rather than new
knowledge alone. This seems to be a worthwhile goal, but how well it can accomplish this goal
remains to be seen. If the outcome is more “matter-of-fact” science, based on more
documentation (or information), and if it can provide insight into idea making—the problemfinding activity that is the work of theorizing—remains to be seen.
More fundamentally, it might be useful to attend also to what is interesting itself about
the scientific enterprise that is neither “matter-of-fact” nor “matter-of-proof” as a way to think
about science. An analogous issue was examined by Ronald Day in his discussion of how
expertise is not based on rules (or codified knowledge) but involves the self as it fits within
broader social and cultural epistemologies and the expert’s use of analogical thinking.42 Fittingly,
Polanyi addressed some scientific consequences of defining science with respect to the problem
of problem-finding, which is based on the personal (the psychological and the epistemological).
Polanyi wrote:
The declared aim of modern science is to establish a strictly detached, objective
knowledge. Any falling short of this ideal is accepted only as a temporary imperfection,
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which we must aim at eliminating. But suppose that tacit thought forms an indispensable
part of all knowledge, then the ideal of eliminating all personal elements of knowledge
would, in effect, aim at the destruction of all knowledge. The ideal of exact science
would turn out to be fundamentally misleading and possibly a source of devastating
fallacies.43
Next:
It is commonplace that all research must start from a problem. Research can be successful
only if the problem is good; it can be original only if the problem is original. But how can
one see a problem, any problem, let alone a good and original problem? For to see a
problem is to see something that is hidden. It is to have an intimation of the coherence of
hitherto not comprehended particulars.44
These passages highlight an important issue in knowledge production and science that is
overlooked in the open science and related literature. This is the issue of problem-finding
(discovering the question to ask that might create knowledge), as opposed to problem-solving
(applying the method that might produce knowledge).
We might spend so much effort on the explicit aspects of knowledge production because
these acts are more tangible (like cobblestones) and because they are often the direct objects of
scientific study itself. For instance, we see in current political debates, in K-12 science
educational practices and so forth, a major emphasis on the analytical methods (like the
simplistic scientific method often taught) that are needed to produce knowledge.45 But this focus
is incomplete. It is true that methodological concerns are important, and it is good that research
articles contain entire sections dedicated to methodology or methods and materials. It is not
clear, however, if opening up the scientific workflow will yield anymore insights into the
production of knowledge, or if it will simply result in more “matter-of-fact” science.
But what about the problem-finding issue? How does someone know what research
question to ask or what problems to attempt to solve? What is a good question, and how do we
articulate one? This tacit dilemma arises out of our sense of the coherence of a thing or a system
without necessarily being able to articulate the particulars of the thing or system. For example, if
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we become aware that we might be predicting when the electric shocks might be coming even
without being able to say why or how we are aware, then we might begin to look for the
particulars so that we may eventually explicate them. This awareness of the coherence of a thing
marks the beginning of the ability to find an intrinsically interesting problem:
Thus the scientific interest—or scientific value—of a contribution is formed by three
factors: its exactitude, its systematic importance, and the intrinsic interest of its subject
matter.46
There are scientific epistemological and commensurability but also aesthetic issues that
are simply not acknowledged adequately by, for instance, the open science community, which
seems to largely assume that more documentation of the parts of doing science produces a
stronger science alone. Pertinent to this is one basic issue: the criterion of demarcation. What
criterion do we use to identify science from what is not science (or pseudoscience)? For Polanyi,
if “we can know more than we can tell” entails there are limits to what we can communicate via
the scholarly publishing system, and open science is about being better at communicating
scientific work, then even under a better model of scholarly and scientific communication there
will always be an upper bound limit on what can be falsified, verified, or reproduced via
scientific documentation. This means there will never be a complete guarantee that scientific
claims can be trusted via the scholarly communication system, even under a widening of that
system. There is ultimately no “matter-of-proof” science, perhaps, and there will always be
something intrinsic in our scientific knowing that is beyond what we can tell and that is tied to
the personal activity of developing a good question to ask that arises, perhaps, out of a personal
sense of coherence of a thing to study.
The aesthetic is important. Polanyi argues that science is demarcated not just by its
truthfulness, its coherence, but also by whether it is interesting in the right theoretical way. This
corresponds to Robert Merton’s statement about the transmission of not just scientific knowing
to the next generation of scientists but also of scientific taste that the “outstanding scientists”
have done so well in communicating, somehow, to the next generations.
The role of outstanding scientists in influencing younger associates is repeatedly
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emphasized in the interviews with [Nobel] laureates. Almost invariably they lay great
emphasis on the importance of problem-finding, not only problem-solving. They
uniformly express the strong conviction that what matters most in their work is a
developing sense of taste, of judgment, in seizing upon problems that are of fundamental
importance.47
There is no reason to be nihilistic about what can be achieved with better scientific
documentation, or by its expanded role, but tacit knowing raises interesting and serious
challenges about the conduct and dissemination of (open) science, as well as any kind of
knowledge that must be taught and passed from one generation to the next, from teacher to
student, or from co-worker to co-worker. This is the task that Polanyi has placed before us. It is
one that deals with a complicated object, the document, that if treated reductively may result in a
failure to understand how we create knowledge and, as importantly, identify what kind of
knowledge we find important to develop. One important question is whether the web and internet
technologies that exist,48 and the type of documents involved in disseminating explicit knowhow and know-that knowledge, are embedded within a culture that welcomes treating the
problem-finding dilemma with the attention it deserves.
*

*

*

The child still dabbles with their story about a dragon and a giant on the computer. The
document is full of brightly colored text and varying font sizes. They learned how to press the
enter and space bar keys repeatedly to create empty space to navigate around the page.
Unsurprisingly, though, it did not take long before they became accustomed to the software.
Even though the graphical metaphor still fails them on occasion, it is with less frequency; it has
largely become more invisible or meaningless to them, just as did long ago for me.
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